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INTRODUCTION: OPPOSING VIEWS OF SALIENCE
To begin with, consider the following four statements, one by one:
(1) The word seemed salient because it was the first word that came to my mind.
(2) The word seemed salient because it was the first word that came to my mind in this context.
(3) The word seemed salient because I had not expected to hear it in this context.
(4) The word seemed salient because I had never heard it before.
It is not unlikely that all four statements seem plausible, although 1 and 2 are actually opposed to 4
and 3 respectively. Apparently, then, words can be considered salient because they are. . .
(1) highly familiar and strongly entrenched,
(2) highly expected in a given context,
(3) highly unexpected in a given context, or
(4) totally unfamiliar.
Surprisingly, linguists have actually relied on at least three of these four scenarios for defining the
notion of salience (see also Bowman et al., 2013, for a psychological perspective). Scenario (1) lies at
the heart of Giora’s idea of salience as what is “foremost on one’s mind [...] stored and coded in the
mental lexicon” (Giora, 2003, p. 15). Scenario (2) accords with Geeraerts’ view of onomasiological
salience in terms of “the relative frequency with which a signifiant is associated with a given signifié”
(Geeraerts, forthcoming), i.e., the frequency with which a word is used to denote a given piece
of experience. Scenario (3) corresponds to understanding salience in terms of surprisal, as, e.g.,
proposed by Rácz: “A segment is cognitively salient if it has a large surprisal value when compared
to an array of language input” (Rácz, 2013, p. 37; see also Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013; Fine et al., 2013;
Divjak, 2016). Scenario (4) represents an extreme variant of type (3) which builds onmemory-based
novelty rather than context-based surprise (see Barto et al., 2013, for this distinction).
The four scenarios can be summarized systematically by a cross-tabulation of two types of
sources of expectations, viz. long-termmemory and current context, with two types of mechanisms
of salience, viz. confirmation and violation of expectations:
(1) Salience by context-free entrenchment: confirmation of expectations based on knowledge
stored in long-term memory.
(2) Salience by contexual entrenchment: confirmation of expectations derived from the probability
of occurrence in the current context.
(3) Salience by surprisal: violation of expectations derived from the probability of occurrence in
the current context.
(4) Salience by novelty: violation of expectations based on lack of stored knowledge.
In this paper we propose a unified framework for salience which reconciles these opposing
conceptions by showing that they focus on different aspects of the interaction between knowledge,
context, expectation, and external input.
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EXPECTATION AND TYPES OF CONTEXTS
Recent theories of linguistic and general perceptual, cognitive,
and/or neural systems and processing share the view that
expectations primed by context are crucial for salience effects to
occur (see Levy, 2008; Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013; Fine et al., 2013;
Jaeger and Snider, 2013; Divjak and Caldwell-Harris, 2015, pp.
59–60). The notions of expectation and context thus seem to hold
the key to a better understanding of salience.
We define expectation as the state of the cognitive system
immediately prior to processing a given linguistic cue. This state
represents the immediate cognitive context for the upcoming
processing event. What becomes activated as immediate
cognitive context results from the interaction between four types
of input which we also regard as contexts:
(1a) Linguistic context, i.e., what has been said before
(1b) Situational context, i.e., the participants, time, place, setting,
objects
(1c) Social context, i.e., the type of social event, the social roles of
and relations between participants
(2) General cognitive context, i.e., general and linguistic
knowledge and routines stored in long-term memory.
All four types of contexts cooperate in shaping the immediate
cognitive context, and yet type (2) differs fundamentally from
the other three types. Whereas types (1a–c) are based on the
current perception of external events, general cognitive context
is internal and based on long-term memory. However, as has
been acknowledged in the psychological literature on salience
and attention (e.g., Wilder et al., 2011; Clark, 2013), the effects of
perception-based external contexts on our immediate cognitive
contexts are invariably modulated by our memory-based general
cognitive contexts, because what we perceive, how we perceive
it, and how we process it linguistically is strongly affected by
what we already know. In addition to this interaction between
current external contexts and long-term internal context (see also
Fine et al., 2013), the three types of external contexts—linguistic,
situational, and social—also influence each other. For example,
the perception of the linguistic context will partly depend on
that of the situational and social context in the use of deictic
expressions such as the book over there or the use of forms of
address like Madam or Doctor. A graphic representation of this
view of expectation and context is provided in Figure 1A.
SALIENCE AS COMPARISON BETWEEN
THE INCOMING LINGUISTIC CUE AND
IMMEDIATE COGNITIVE CONTEXT
Salience effects arise when an incoming linguistic cue is processed
before the backdrop of the immediate cognitive context. Since
salience effects are considered to involve the confirmation or
violation of expectations (see Introduction: Opposing Views
of Salience), the notion of salience—both in perception and
in language—logically depends on a comparison between
expectations and the cue to be processed. This characteristic
is shared by perceptual and linguistic salience. A word that is
surprising in a given linguistic or situational context (see Scenario
3 in Introduction: Opposing Views of Salience) is salient by
virtue of the same principle as a green apple is in an array of
red apples, i.e., through a comparison of a piece of information
against its context. What is special about salience in language
is that linguistic context plays a key role, and that general long-
termmemory-based context includes the full range of entrenched
linguistic knowledge and routines, i.e., the individual’s current
linguistic competence.
DIFFERENT VIEWS OF SALIENCE
HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENT OUTCOMES OF
THE COMPARISON
We would like to argue that the seemingly opposing types
of salience explained in the introduction correspond to four
different outcomes of the comparison between the immediate
cognitive context and its sources, and the incoming linguistic cue
(see Figure 1B).
(1) Salience by context-free entrenchment: the incoming cue
matches expectations that are mainly activated from general
cognitive context, i.e., linguistic knowledge stored in long-
term memory; this is the case for a very frequent word
that is generally highly familiar and strongly entrenched,
irrespective of the current context.
(2) Salience by contextual entrenchment: the incoming cue
matches expectations whose activation is mainly triggered
by current linguistic, situational, and/or social context;
examples are words that are strongly suggested by what
was said before (e.g., as part of a strong collocation), by
situational circumstances (e.g., by reference to a salient
object), or by social aspects of the speech event (e.g.,
in a ritualized speech event like a baptizing or wedding
ceremony).
(3) Salience by surprisal: the incoming cue fails to match
expectations that are mainly activated from current
linguistic, situational, and/or social context; this could arise
from violations of collocational restrictions or preferences,
from unfamiliar ways of referring to objects, or from
different conceptions of the social significance of words.
(4) Salience by novelty: the incoming cue completely fails to
match up with expectations activated from long memory;
the hearer encounters a word that he or she simply does not
know.
The four different views of salience thus highlight different
interactions between internal and external contexts as sources of
salience on the one hand, and the mechanisms of confirmation
and violation of expectations on the other. The main step
forward made by the integrative and unified view we are
proposing consists in the way in which it integrates internal
and external as well as long-term and short-term contextual
effects. This characteristic of the model opens up further options
for explaining interactional and social salience effects that we
have neglected so far because we have focused on an individual
idealized speaker.
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FIGURE 1 | Embedding salience effects in a generalized contextual interaction framework. (A) Expectations and types of contexts. (B) Salience as
comparison between linguistic cue and expectation. (C) Different internal contexts due to different linguistic experience.
VIOLATION-BASED SALIENCE IN
INTERACTION CAN ARISE FROM
EXPERIENCE-BASED SOCIAL
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SPEAKERS
Linguistic salience effects arise in the interaction between two or
more interlocutors. So the framework proposed thus far must
be extended. Figure 1C represents the idealized case of two
participants, a speaker (S) and hearer (H), engaged in face-to-
face interaction. As is indicated in the Figure, in this case the
participants largely share the same external linguistic, situational,
and social context. The impact of these external contexts on their
respective immediate cognitive contexts is not identical, however,
partly because the participants may not have equal perceptual
access to what was said before or to objects in the shared situation.
More importantly, and as pointed out above, the effect of external
context is modulated by internal long-term knowledge, which is
by definition individual rather than shared (see Fine et al., 2013,
p. 1), and therefore differs from speaker to speaker (as is indicated
by the arrows interrupted by the “is unequal” symbol).
The effect of these differences is that, despite shared external
context, the current expectations of the two participants differ
because the linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge they recruit
for shaping their immediate cognitive contexts is not the same.
Figure 1C illustrates a case where a linguistic cue (e.g., a word)
that is highly familiar to the speaker is contextually surprising to
the hearer. Such a word would be confirmation-based salient for
the speaker, but violation-based salient for the hearer if the latter
does not expect the word in this context or has never heard it
before.
The likelihood of such situations correlates with the
difference between the participants’ general cognitive contexts,
i.e., their entrenched linguistic association patterns and routines.
According to usage-based models of grammar (e.g., Barlow and
Kemmer, 2000; The Five Graces Group, 2009) these patterns
and routines are shaped by lifelong linguistic experience, which
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is in turn shaped by social factors such as group-membership
and participation in social networks and communities of
practice (Schmid, 2015; see the left-hand side of in Figure 1C).
At this point, the cognitive dimension of the framework is
supplemented by the social dimension. While the cognitive
dimension highlights the existence of individual differences, the
social dimension licenses testable predictions concerning the
sources of these differences and their effects on salience. One
such prediction is that interlocutors from distant social groups
in terms of education, age, ethnicity, gender, and other classic
social variables are more likely to experience violation-based
salience effects—“I have never heard this before,” “I would not
have expected this in this context”—than interlocutors who share
their social background and linguistic experience. In this way, our
framework naturally integrates salience effects typically observed
in sociolinguistic conceptions of salience. We therefore regard
is as an integrative and unifying socio-cognitive framework for
understanding salience. The paper by Jaeger and Weatherholtz
(2016) in this special issue, which accords extremely well with
the ideas presented here, provides more details and empirical
evidence concerning the sociolinguistic aspects.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a unified framework which reconciles the
tension between opposing views of salience by means of a
differentiated conception of two central elements of salience,
viz. expectation and context. Linguistic salience emerges from a
comparison between an incoming linguistic cue and expectations
that are activated from the interaction between current
perception-based linguistic, situational, and social context, and
long-term memory-based cognitive context (i.e., linguistic and
encyclopedic knowledge). Different existing conceptions of
salience highlight different aspects of this coherent framework.
Experientially and socially motivated differences between the
long-term memory-based cognitive contexts of individuals can
be responsible for surprisal-based salience effects. The framework
proposed is thus socio-cognitive in the sense that it accommodates
both cognitive and social causes of linguistic salience effects.
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